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Abstract
This paper addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in one-way ﬂow or directed net-
work models in a number of diﬀerent settings. In these models players form costly links
with other players and obtain resources from them through the directed path connecting
them. We ﬁnd that heterogeneity in the costs of establishing links play a crucial role in
the existence of Nash networks. We also provide conditions for the existence of Nash
networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogeneous.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D85
Key Words: Network Formation, Non-cooperative Games
1 1 Introduction
Galeotti (2006) characterized the Nash equilibria of one-way ﬂow (or directed) net-
works under heterogeneity. He considers directed networks where agents must form
costly links to obtain beneﬁcial information from other agents. Heterogeneity in his
formulation occurs in the value of information possessed by other players as well as
in the cost of forming links. However, the question of existence of Nash equilibria for
such models has not been resolved. Our paper complements the existing literature by
addressing this issue.
The study of non-cooperative models of network formation was initiated by Bala
and Goyal (2000). These authors examine both one-way ﬂow and two-way ﬂow (or
undirected) networks. In the second type of networks, unlike in the former, a link be-
tween two players allows both players to get access to each other’s resources regardless
of who initiates the link. Bala and Goyal characterize and provide a constructive proof
of existence of Nash equilibria for both directed and undirected networks under the as-
sumption of homogeneous costs and beneﬁts across players.
However, Bala and Goyal (2000) do not address the question of heterogeneity of costs
and beneﬁts of links. This is a critical shortcoming for two reasons. First, heterogeneity
in costs and beneﬁts is pervasive in social and economic networks. For instance, in the
context of information networks, it is often the case that some individuals are better
informed, which makes them more valuable contacts. Similarly, as individuals diﬀer, it
seems natural that forming links is cheaper for some individuals as compared to oth-
ers. In other words, players can be distinct in terms of cultural, legal or geographical
proximity, and it may be cheaper for a given player to form a link with a closer player.
2Second, the introduction of various heterogeneity conditions on costs and values pro-
vides a sensitivity check for the results obtained with homogeneous parameters. Thus,
in this paper we ask if the introduction of diﬀerent types of heterogeneity in the Bala
and Goyal (2000) framework as analyzed by Galeotti (2006) alters existence results for
Nash networks.
A few papers have explored heterogeneity in the context of Nash networks. Galeotti,
Goyal and Kamphorst (2005) and Haller and Sarangi (2005) characterize Nash networks
in two-way ﬂow models. The existence of Nash networks in such models has been stud-
ied by Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi (2005). Galeotti (2006) examines one-way ﬂow
models under value and cost heterogeneity while Billand and Bravard, 2005) take into
account the role of congestion in Nash network models. Neither paper however addresses
the issue of existence of such networks.1
In this paper we investigate the existence of Nash networks in the one-way ﬂow
model when costs and values of links are heterogeneous. We focus on one-way ﬂow
models with linear payoﬀs as described in Galeotti (2006). Moreover, we do not allow
for decay and permit players to only use pure strategies.2 We show that the Bala and
Goyal results are not quite robust: there does not always exist a Nash network when
heterogeneity in costs and values of links is introduced. More precisely, we ﬁnd that, as
in the two-way ﬂow model, heterogeneity in costs of forming links plays a major role in
1Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of pairwise stable networks – the other com-
monly used stability concept in this literature can be found in Jackson and Watts (2001).
2Following the networks literature we concentrate only on pure strategies since the idea of randomiz-
ing between diﬀerent links is usually considered unrealistic. Further, all the network games considered
here are ﬁnite and hence existence of mixed strategy equilibria is guaranteed.
3the non existence of Nash networks.3 This is because cost heterogeneity provides link
substitution possibilities as in Example 1. We then provide bounds on costs of forming
links that guarantee the existence of Nash networks. We also show that if costs are
homogeneous (and values are not), then Nash networks always exist.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set the basic
one-way ﬂow model. In Section 3 we present the results about the existence of Nash net-
works for this model. More precisely we study this problem under various heterogeneity
conditions on costs and values. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model Setup
Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of players. The network relations among these players
are formally represented by directed graphs whose nodes are the players. A network
g = (N,E) is a pair of sets: the set N of players and the edges set E(g) ⊂ N × N of
directed links. A link initiated by player i to player j is denoted by i j. Each player
i chooses a strategy gi = (gi1,...,gii−1,gii+1,...,gin), gij ∈ {0,1} for all j ∈ N \ {i},
which describes the decision of establishing links. More precisely, gij = 1 if and only if
i j ∈ E(g). The interpretation of gij = 1 is that player i forms a link with player j  = i,
and the interpretation of gij = 0 is that i does not form a link with player j. We assume
in the following that every player is always trivially connected to herself, so gii = 1 for
all i ∈ N and do not include it in gi. We only use pure strategies. Note that gij = 1
does not necessarily imply that gji = 1. Indeed it is possible i is linked to j, but j is
not linked to i. Let G = ×n
i=1Gi be the set of all possible networks where Gi is the set
3One-way ﬂow models however are diﬀerent from two-way ﬂow models since cycles cannot be ruled
out in the best response process. Thus the existence proofs are also diﬀerent.
4of all possible strategies of player i ∈ N. Finally, let P(G) be the power set of G, that
is the set of all subsets of G.
We now provide some important graph theoretic deﬁnitions. For a directed graph,
g ∈ G, a path P(g) of length m in g from player j to i, i  = j, is a ﬁnite sequence
i0,i1,...,im of distinct players such that i0 = i, im = j and gikik+1 = 1 for k =
0,...,m − 1. If i0 = im, then the path is a cycle. We denote the set of cycles in the
network g by C(g). Let C(g) be a typical member of C(g). In the empty network, ˙ g,
there are no links between any agents.
To sum up, a link from a player j to a player i (gij = 1) allows player i to get
resources from player j but since we are in a one-way ﬂow model, this link does not
allow player j to obtain resources from i. Moreover, a player i may receive information
from other players through a sequence of indirect links. To be precise, information ﬂows
from player j to player i, if i and j are linked by a path in g from j to i. Let
Ni(g) = {j ∈ N| there exists a path in g from j to i},
be the set of players that player i can access in the network g. By deﬁnition, we assume
that i ∈ Ni(g) for all i ∈ N and for all g ∈ G. Let ni(g) be the cardinality of the set
Ni(g). Finally, we deﬁne η : G →
R, η(g) =
P
i∈N ni(g) as a function.
Information received from player j is worth Vij to player i. Moreover, i incurs a cost cij
when she initiates a direct link with j, i.e. when gij = 1. We can now deﬁne the payoﬀ








We assume that cij > 0 and Vij > 0 for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, i  = j. Also, we normalize
Vii = 0 for all i ∈ N. The next deﬁnition introduces the diﬀerent notions of heterogeneity
in our model.
5Deﬁnition 1 Values (or costs) are said heterogeneous by pairs of players if there exist
i,j,k ∈ N such that Vij  = Vik (cij  = cik) and there exist i′,j′,k′ ∈ N such that Vj′i′  = Vk′i′
(cj′i′  = ck′i′). Values (or costs) are said heterogeneous by players if for all i,j,k ∈ N:
Vij = Vik = Vi (cij = cik = ci) but there exist i,i′ ∈ N such that Vi  = Vi′ (ci  = ci′).
We now provide some useful deﬁnitions for studying the existence of Nash networks.
Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i denote the network obtained when all of player i’s links
are removed. The network g can be written as g = g−i ⊕ gi, where the operator ⊕
indicates that g is formed by the union of links in gi and g−i. The strategy gi is said
to be a best response of player i to g−i if:
πi(gi ⊕ g−i) ≥ πi(g
′
i ⊕ g−i),for all g
′
i ∈ Gi.
The set of player i’s best responses to g−i is denoted by BRi(g−i). Furthermore, a
network g = (g1,...,gi,...,gn) is said to be a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for each
i ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 2 We say that two networks g and g′ are adjacent if there is a unique player
i such that gij  = g′
ij for at least one player j  = i.
An improving path is a sequence of adjacent networks that results when players
form or sever links based on payoﬀ improvement the new network oﬀers over the current
network. More precisely, each network in the sequence diﬀers from the previous one by
the links formed (or severed) by one unique player. Note that if a player changes her
links, it must be that this player strictly beneﬁts from such a change.
Deﬁnition 3 Formally, an improving path from a network g to a network g′ is a ﬁnite
sequence of networks g1,...,gℓ,gℓ+1,...,gk, with g1 = g and gk = g′, such that the
two following conditions are veriﬁed:
61. gℓ and gℓ+1, are adjacent networks;
2. Let i ∈ N be the player such that gℓ
ij  = g
ℓ+1





i  ∈ BRi(gℓ
−i), that is gℓ+1 is a network where i
plays a best response while gℓ is a network where i does not play a best response.
Moreover, if g1 = gk, then the improving path is called an improving cycle.
It follows that a network g is a Nash network if and only if it has no improving path
emanating from it.
3 Model with Heterogeneous Agents
Bala and Goyal (2000) outline a constructive proof of the existence of Nash networks in
the one-way ﬂow model when costs and values of links are homogeneous. We show that
the introduction of heterogeneity in costs and values of links by pairs does not change
the Nash networks existence result of Bala and Goyal when the number of players is
n = 3. However, this result is no longer true if the number of players is n > 3.
Proposition 1 Let the payoﬀ be given by (1).
1. If values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs and n = 3, then a Nash
network always exists.
2. If values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs and n > 3, then a Nash
network does not always exist.
7We prove only the ﬁrst part of the proposition. Indeed, to prove the second part of
the proposition, it is enough to give an example with n > 3 and where there does not
exist any Nash network when values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs (Ex-
ample 1). Note that in Example 1 we assume that values are the same for all players
and costs are heterogeneous by pairs and we show that there does no exist any Nash
network. However, by a continuity argument the non existence of Nash networks in
such a context implies the non existence of Nash networks in contexts where values are
heterogeneous by pairs.
Proof of Proposition 1 Let N = {1,2,3}. We begin with the empty network ˙ g.
Either ˙ g is a Nash network and we are done, or ˙ g is not a Nash network and there exists
an improving path from ˙ g to an adjacent network g1. That is, there exists a player, say
without loss of generality player 1, such that ˙ g1  ∈ BR1(˙ g−1) and g1
1 ∈ BR1(˙ g−1). Since
1 ∈ N has no link in ˙ g and forms links in g1 = g1
1⊕ ˙ g−1, we have η(˙ g) < η(g1). Now we
repeat this step. Assume an improving path from a network g1 to a network gk where
for each player i ∈ N, we have Ni(gk−1) ⊆ Ni(gk). We show that if there exists an
improving path from gk to gk+1, then for each player i ∈ N, Ni(gk) ⊆ Ni(gk+1). Let i




i  ∈ BRi(gk
−i). We show that if j ∈ Ni(gk),
then j ∈ Ni(gk+1). Indeed there are two possibilities for j ∈ Ni(gk).
1. Either gk
ij = 1, that is i directly obtains the resources of player j. Then there are
two possibilities.
• If Vij − cij > 0, then j ∈ Ni(gk+1), otherwise i is not playing a best response
in gk+1.
• If Vij −cij < 0, then there is a network gk′
, k′ < k, such that ℓ ∈ Nj(gk′
) and
8Vij + Viℓ − cij > max{0,Viℓ − ciℓ}, else gk
ij = 0. Since Nj(gk′
) ⊆ Nj(gk), for
all k′ < k and for all j ∈ N, we have ℓ ∈ Nj(gk) and player i deletes her link
with j only if j ∈ Nℓ(gk) and Vij + Viℓ − cij < Vij + Viℓ − ciℓ. In that case, i
forms a link with ℓ and j ∈ Ni(gk+1).
2. Or gk
ij = 0, gk
iℓ = 1 and gk
ℓj = 1, that is i indirectly obtains the resources of player
j. Then, we use the same argument as above to show that player i deletes her link
with ℓ only if she has an incentive to form a link with j and j ∈ Ni(gk+1).
We now show that there does not exist a cycle in the improving path Q = {˙ g,g1,...,
gt,...,gt+τ,...,gt+τ′
,...}, with τ′ > τ > 0. It suﬃces to show that if gt





ij = 1, then we have Ni(gt) ( Ni(gt+τ′). Note that as j ∈ Ni(gt) and Ni(gt) ⊆
Ni(gt+τ), we have j ∈ Ni(gt+τ). Also, as g
t+τ
ij = 0, we have g
t+τ
iℓ = 1 and ℓ ∈ Ni(gt+τ).
Moreover, as Ni(gt+τ) ⊆ Ni(gt+τ′), we have Ni(gt+τ′) = {j,ℓ}.
Without loss of generality, let player i delete the link i j for the ﬁrst time, between t
and t+τ, in gt+τ. Likewise, we assume that player i forms the link i j for the ﬁrst time,
between t + τ and t + τ′, in gt+τ′
.
We have two cases.
1. Suppose gt
iℓ = 0. To obtain a contradiction, assume that ℓ ∈ Ni(gt). It follows
that g
t+τ
jℓ = 1 since player i does not form the link i ℓ between gt and gt+τ if j
preserves the link j ℓ. Also j does not delete the link j ℓ between gt and gt+τ if i
does not form the link i ℓ (recall that in our process only one player changes her
strategy in each period). Since player i chooses to delete the link i j in gt+τ, then
she must form the link i ℓ and we must have g
t+τ
ℓj = 1, since ℓ ∈ Ni(gt) ⊆ Ni(gt+τ).
Moreover, the substitution of the link i j by the link i ℓ implies that cij > ciℓ. By
the same argument, player ℓ does not delete the link ℓ j between gt+τ and gt+τ′.
9Therefore, if player i forms the link i j in gt+τ′
(and deletes the link i ℓ), then we
have cij < ciℓ and giving us the desired contradiction.
2. Suppose that gt
iℓ = 1. If player i deletes the link i j in gt+τ, then we obtain the
situation in case 1 up to a permutation of players j and ℓ. Hence the proof follows.
￿
We have shown that if values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs and n = 3,
a Nash network always exists. Note that this result is not true for the model with two-
way ﬂow of resources (see Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi 2006 pg. 7). We now give an
example with 4 players where there does not exist any Nash network.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3,4} be the set of players and Vij = V for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N.
Moreover, we suppose that c13 = V − V/16 and c12 = c14 = 4V ; c21 = 2V − V/16 and
c23 = c24 = 4V ; c32 = 2V − V/8, c34 = 2V − V/6 and c31 = 4V ; c41 = 3V − V/8 and
c42 = c43 = 4V .
1. In a best response, player 2 never forms a link with player 3 or player 4. Moreover,
player 2 has an incentive to form a link with player 1 if the latter gets resources
from player 3 or player 4.
2. In a best response, player 4 never forms links with player 3 or player 2.
3. Then the unique best response of player 1 to any network in which she does not
observe player 3 is to add a link with player 3 (since player 2 and player 4 never
form a link with player 3). Moreover, we note that player 1 never has an incentive
to form a link with player 2 or player 4.
4. In a best response, player 3 never forms a link with player 1.
10Now let us take those best replies for granted and consider best responses regarding the
remaining links 2 1; 3 2; 3 4 and 4 1. If player 2 initiates the link 2 1 (see g0 in ﬁgure
1), then player 3’s best response is to initiate the link 3 2 (see g1). In that case player
4 must initiate the link 4 1 (see g2) and player 3 must replace the link 3 2 by the link
3 4 (see g3). Then, player 4 must delete the link 4 1 (see g4) and the player 3 must
replace the link 3 4 by the link 3 2 (see g1). Hence there do not exist any mutual best
responses. Therefore, a Nash network does not exist.
Finally, by appropriately adjusting costs, it can be veriﬁed that this example holds
even if we relax the assumption that Vij = V for all i,j ∈ N. In particular, using a
continuity argument it is possible to construct an example where values are heterogeneous
by players, costs are heterogeneous by pairs, and a Nash network does not exist.


















g0 g1 g2 g3 g4
This example shows that unlike in two-way ﬂow models existence results in one-way ﬂow
models with heterogeneity depend crucially on the number of players. Indeed, the proof
of existence of Nash networks with three players is based on the following fact: after
a given player i has played a best response, the set of players from whom she obtains
resources always contains the set of players from whom she obtained resources before.
Example 1 shows that this property does not hold anymore when n > 3. Indeed, in
11this example, player 3’s best response requires him not to obtain resources from player
2 in network g4. Given that heterogeneity often arises in reality, such a negative result
suggests that one must be cautitious when using Nash networks. Later in the paper,
we show that there exist bounds on costs which are suﬃcient for the existence of Nash
equilibria when costs and values are heterogeneous by pairs (see Corollary 1).
3.1 Existence of Nash networks under heterogeneity of values
by pairs
In this section, we present a proof of the existence of Nash networks in the one-way ﬂow
model where values are heterogeneous by pairs and costs are heterogeneous by players.
Our proof is quite diﬀerent from the proof of Haller, Kamphorst and Sarangi (2006)
who address the Nash existence problem in the two-way ﬂow model. Essentially, in the
one-way ﬂow model, unlike in the two-way ﬂow model, we cannot rule out the existence
of cycles in the best response process.4 Our proof takes cycles into account by modifying
the network obtained when a player plays a best response in such a way that no player
has an incentive to remove any of her links.
The payoﬀ function when values are heterogeneous by pairs and costs are heteroge-










i(g) be the marginal payoﬀ of player i from player j in the network g. If
gij = 1, then we have π
j
i(g) = πi(g)−πi(g⊖i j). To take double counting into account
4For an example showing such cycles, refer to the working paper version (Billand, Bravard and
Sarangi, 2007, http:\\www.bus.lsu.edu\economics\papers\pap07 02.pdf).
12we deﬁne the following set. Let K(g;i j) = Ni(g ⊖ i j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i j), where g ⊖ i j











Vik − ci. (3)
We now deﬁne some classes of networks that are useful in the proof of the next
proposition. We say that a network g is minimal if it is not possible to delete any link
i j ∈ E(g) formed by player i in g without altering the set Ni(g). In other words, if a
link of g, say i j, is deleted, then Ni(g ⊖ i j)  = Ni(g). Let Gm be the set of minimal
networks.
Let G1 = {g ∈ Gm|i ∈ Nj(g),j  ∈ Ni(g),k  ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ gki = 0} be a subset of min-
imal networks. Let G2 ⊂ G1 be the set of networks which contain at most one cy-
cle. If g ∈ G2 and g contains a cycle, then we denote by C(g) the cycle in the
network g. We denote by NC(g) the set of players who belong to the cycle C(g),
and EC(g) ⊂ NC(g) × NC(g) the set of links which belong to the cycle C(g). Let
G3 = {g ∈ G2|i ∈ C(g),j  ∈ C(g) ⇒ gji = 0} be the set of networks where there
does not exist a link between a player i ∈ NC(g) to a player j  ∈ NC(g). Next we present
some properties of these minimal networks.
Lemma 1 Suppose values of links are heterogeneous by pairs and costs of links are
heterogeneous by players and g ∈ G3.
1. For all i,j ∈ N, if gji = 1, then there does not exist any player k such that gki = 1.
2. For all i,j ∈ N, if gij = 1, then K(g;i j) = Ni(g ⊖ i j)
T
Ni(g−i ⊕ i j) is an
empty set.
13Lemma 1 describes the properties of networks g ∈ G3. The proof of this lemma is simple
and can be found in Billand, Bravard and Sarangi (2007).5 Lemma 1.1 says that, given
any two agents j and k, only one of them will form a link to i. Essentially it would be
better if they form the other link between them instead of going directly to i. Lemma
1.2 says that there is only one path between any two agents. Both properties follow
from the minimality of g and the fact that G3 ⊂ G2 ⊂ G1.








Vik − ci. (4)
In the following lemma, which provides the best response properties of the networks
g ∈ G3, we let g′
i ∈ Gi be a strategy of player i, with g′
i  = gi.
Lemma 2 Suppose values of links are heterogeneous by pairs, costs of links are hetero-
geneous by players and g ∈ G3. Moreover, let the payoﬀ function be given by (2).
1. Suppose players i,j,k ∈ N are such that j  ∈ Ni(g), i ∈ Nj(g), k  ∈ Nj(g). If
g′
ki = 1, then g′
k  ∈ BRk(g−k).
2. Suppose g contains a cycle C(g) and for all i,j ∈ NC(g), and for all i j ∈ EC(g),
we have π
j
i(g) > 0. If g′
ij = 0, then g′
i  ∈ BRi(g−i).
3. Suppose i ∈ N, j ∈ N \ NC(g) and gij = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(g) > 0. If g′
ij = 0, then
g′
i  ∈ BRi(g−i).
Again the proof is simple and can be found in Billand, Bravard and Sarangi (2007).
Lemma 2.1 claims that if j observes i and i does not observe j, then k cannot be playing
a best response if she establishes a link with i. This is because either k already observes
5http:\\www.bus.lsu.edu\economics\papers\pap07 02.pdf.
14i and hence it cannot be a best response to form a link with i, or she does not observe
i, in which case she should form a link with j, since this will also allow her to obtain
i’s information. Lemma 2.2 states that if i j ∈ EC(g) and the marginal payoﬀ from j is
strictly positive, then deleting the link i j is not a best response for player i. Lemma
2.3 applies the same argument to a player j who does not belong to the cycle C(g).
Proposition 2 Suppose values of links are heterogeneous by pairs and costs of links are
heterogeneous by players. Moreover, let the payoﬀ be given by (2). Then a Nash network
always exists.
The proof of Proposition 2 is long, and involves a number of lemmas. So we ﬁrst
provide a quick overview of the proof. It consists in constructing a sequence of networks,
Q = (g0,...,gt−1,gt,...), beginning with the empty network. In each subsequent net-
work, no player should have an incentive to decrease the amount of resources she obtains.
Note that this sequence of networks is not an improving path. Indeed, we go from gt
to gt+1 in several operations. First, in gt we let a player i ∈ N, who is not playing
a best response in gt, play a best response (if such player does not exist, gt is a Nash
network) and we obtain a network called bri(gt). Second, we modify the network bri(gt)
as follows: we construct a cycle using all players j ∈ N who obtain resources from a
player k who forms part of a cycle in bri(gt), while preserving all links in bri(gt) between
a player k ∈ N and a player j who is not part of a cycle in bri(gt). We obtain a network
called h(bri(gt)). Thirdly, we delete all links i j which does not allow player i to obtain
additional resources in h(bri(gt)). We obtain a network called m(h(bri(gt))) = gt
i, and
in the sequence Q, we have gt+1 = gt
i.
When a player i receives an opportunity to revise her strategy, we go from a network gt
to a network gt+1, and we will show that η(gt−1) < η(gt). Since the amount of resources
15that players can obtain in a network g ∈ Q is ﬁnite, Q is ﬁnite and there exists a Nash
network. More precisely, in the following we show that G3 contains all networks in the
sequence Q (Lemma 5). Then, we use the condition which implies that no player has
an incentive to delete a link in a network g ∈ G3 (Lemma 2). Finally, we show that all
networks gt ∈ Q satisfy this condition since the empty network satisﬁes this condition
(Lemma 6).
We now introduce some additional deﬁnitions that are required to complete the
proof. Let MBRi(g−i) be a modiﬁed version of the best response function of player
i ∈ N. More precisely, g′
i ∈ MBRi(g−i) if g′
i is a best response of player i against
g−i and if player i does not form any links that yield zero marginal payoﬀs. Let bri :
G → G, g  → bri(g) be a function. The network bri(g) = (g′
i ⊕ g−i) is a network
where g′
i ∈ MBRi(g−i), and all other players j  = i have the same links as in the
network g (since bri(g) is a network, bri(g)ij ∈ {0,1} indicates if player i forms a link
with player j). In other words, in bri(g), we have bri(g)ij = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0 and
bri(g)ij = 0 ⇒ π
j
i(bri(g)) ≤ 0.
Let H : G → P(G) be a correspondence. A network h(g) ∈ H(g) is a network
associated with g such that h(g) contains at most one cycle, C(h(g)). Since h(g) is
a network, h(g)ij ∈ {0,1} indicates if player i forms a link with player j in h(g). We
now state the rules for constructing the network h(g). If k is such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and
ℓ ∈ NC(g), then k ∈ NC(h(g)). If k  ∈ NC(h(g)), then for all ℓ ∈ N, we have gℓk = h(g)ℓk.
This is diﬀerent from the networks in G2 since there is no minimality restriction here.
This operation creates one cycle leaving unchanged the strategies of those players who
do not belong to the cycle.
Let M : G → P(G), g  → M(g) be a correspondence. Let m(g) be a typical element
16of M(g). Since m(g) is a network, m(g)ij ∈ {0,1} indicates if player i forms a link
with player j in m(g). Next, we provide the rules for constructing the network m(g)
from a network g ∈ G. A network m(g) is such that, for all i,j ∈ N, Ni(g) = Ni(m(g))
and if m(g)ij = 1, then j  ∈ Ni(m(g) ⊖ i j) and gij = 1. It is obvious that m(g) is a
minimal network. Obviously, we have η(g) = η(m(g)). In the following, without loss of
generality, we can select any element of M(g).
Observe that for all g ∈ G and for all k ∈ N, we have, by construction, for all
g′ ∈ M ◦ H(g), Nk(g) ⊆ Nk(g′). Finally, we deﬁne
g
i ∈ M ◦ H ◦ bri(g), (5)
as a network obtained from g after performing the three operations deﬁned above. Note
that the superscript in gi refers to the fact that in this network player i is playing a best
response. Since gi is a network, gi
ij ∈ {0,1} indicates if player i forms a link with player
j in gi, and gi
−i denote the network obtained when all of player i’s links are removed in
gi. In the next two lemmas we describe properties of the networks gi and bri(g).
Lemma 3 Let the payoﬀ function be given by (2) and let gi be deﬁned as in equation
(5). Suppose g ∈ G3 and for all k ∈ N, j ∈ N, gkj = 1 ⇒ π
j
k(g) > 0.
1. If k ∈ Nj(g), then k ∈ Nj(bri(g)).
2. If k ∈ Nj(g), then k ∈ Nj(gi).
3. If gi  ∈ BRi(g−i), then η(g) < η(gi).
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
We denote g \MBRi(g−i) by gm. Then gm⊕i j is the network obtained from bri(g)
when player i forms no link except the link i j.
17Lemma 4 Let the payoﬀ function be given by (2) and let gi be deﬁned as in equation
(5). Suppose g ∈ G3.
1. If gi
ij = bri(g)ij = 1, then, for all j ∈ N \ {i}, Nj(gm ⊕ i j) ⊆ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i j).
2. Suppose for all i ∈ N, j ∈ N, gij = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(g) > 0. If gi
kℓ = gkℓ = 1, then
Nℓ(g−k ⊕ k ℓ) ⊆ Nℓ(gi
−k ⊕ k ℓ).
The proof of this lemma can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 5 Let the payoﬀ function be given by (2) and let gi be deﬁned as in equation
(5). If g ∈ G3, then gi ∈ G3.
Proof We must show that gi has the following four properties: it is a minimal network,
it contains at most one cycle, there does not exist a link from j  ∈ NC(gi) to k ∈ NC(gi)
and if ℓ ∈ Nj(gi),j  ∈ Nℓ(gi),k  ∈ Nj(gi) then gi
kℓ = 0. The ﬁrst property follows from
the correspondence M and the next two from the correspondence H. We just need to
verify that the last property holds.
First, we show that in bri(g), we have ℓ ∈ Nj(bri(g)), j  ∈ Nℓ(bri(g)), i  ∈ Nj(bri(g))
⇒ bri (g)iℓ = 0. We know that in g we have ℓ ∈ Nj(g),j  ∈ Nℓ(g),i  ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ giℓ = 0
since g ∈ G3. By deﬁnition, we have bri(g)k = gk, for all k ∈ N \ {i}. Hence, if we
show that player i  ∈ Nj(bri(g)) has not formed a link i ℓ with a player ℓ such that
ℓ ∈ Nj(bri(g)) and j  ∈ Nℓ(bri(g)) in bri(g), then we will have shown the conclusion for
bri(g). But, by Lemma 2.1, we know that if i has formed a link with player ℓ, then i is
not playing a best response which is a contradiction.
Second, by construction, if g is such that ℓ ∈ Nj(g),j  ∈ Nℓ(g),k  ∈ Nj(g) ⇒ g
k ℓ = 0,
then g′ ∈ M ◦ H(g) is such that ℓ ∈ Nj(g′), j  ∈ Nℓ(g′), k  ∈ Nj(g′) ⇒ g′
kℓ = 0. The
conclusion follows. ￿
18Lemma 6 Let the payoﬀ function be given by (2) and let gi be deﬁned as in equation
(5).
1. If g ∈ G3, then gi
ij = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gi) > 0.
2. If for all i,j ∈ N, gij = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(g) > 0, then for all i ∈ N \ {k}, j ∈ N,
gk
ij = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gk) > 0.
Proof We prove both parts of the lemma successively.
1. (a) First, we show that this property is true if gi
ij = 1 and j  ∈ NC(gi). If
j  ∈ NC(gi), then by construction bri(g)ij = 1 and so π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0. Using







−i⊕i j)Vik − ci
≥
P
k∈Nj(gm⊕i j) Vik −
P




(b) Second, we show that this property is true if gi
ij = 1 and j ∈ NC(gi). By
construction if gi
ij = 1 and j ∈ NC(gi), then i ∈ NC(gi). If i ∈ NC(gi),
then by construction of gi, there is at least one player ℓ ∈ NC(gi), such
that πℓ
i(bri(g)) > 0. So for all players ℓ′ ∈ NC(gi), there exists a network




i ((gi)′). We know by Lemma 4.1, that Nj(gm ⊕
i j) ⊆ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i j). Finally, by Lemma 5, we know that gi ∈ G3. Hence






−i⊕i j) Vik − ci =
P
k∈Nℓ((gi
−i)′⊕i ℓ) Vik − ci
≥
P
k∈Nℓ(gm⊕i ℓ) Vik −
P
k∈K(gm⊕i ℓ;i ℓ) Vik − ci
= πℓ
i(bri(g)) > 0.




ij = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gk) > 0. Indeed, if player i ∈ N \ {k} has initiated a link
with player j  ∈ NC(gk) in gk, then, by construction of gk, player i has formed
a link with player j in g, so π
j
i(g) > 0. We know from Lemma 4.2, that for all
j ∈ N, we have Nj(g−i ⊕ i j) ⊆ Nj(gk
−i ⊕ i j). Moreover, by Lemma 5, gk ∈ G3.






−i⊕i j) Viℓ − ci
≥
P




Next, we show that for all i ∈ N \ {k}, and for all j ∈ NC(gk), if gij = 1 ⇒
π
j
i(g) > 0, then gk
ij = 1 ⇒ π
j
i(gk) > 0. Since gk ∈ G3 and there exists a link
from player j to player i, we have i ∈ NC(gk). If i ∈ NC(gk), then there are
two possibilities: either k ∈ Ni(brk(g)) or i ∈ NC(g). We deal with these two
possibilities successively.
(a) If k ∈ Ni(brk(g)), then there exists in brk(g) a link i ℓ such that brk(g)iℓ =
giℓ = 1 and k ∈ Nℓ(brk(g)). Since, giℓ = 1, we have πℓ
i(g) > 0. Furthermore,
20by construction, player ℓ ∈ NC(gk), since k ∈ Nℓ(brk(g)). We note that for all
players h′ ∈ NC(gk), there exists a network (gk)′ ∈ M◦H◦brk(g) where player




know from Lemma 4.2 that for all j ∈ N, we have Nj(g−i⊕i j) ⊆ Nj(gk
−i⊕i j).
Finally, we know by Lemma 5 that gi ∈ G3. Hence, using the marginal payoﬀ






−i⊕i j)Viℓ′ − ci =
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ((gk
−i)′⊕i ℓ) Viℓ′ − ci
≥
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ(g−i⊕i ℓ) Viℓ′ − ci = πℓ
i(g) > 0.
(b) If i ∈ N
C(g)
, then we have πℓ
i(g) > 0 for i ℓ ∈ EC(g). We assume, without loss
of generality, that player i forms in C(gi) a link with a player j such that
π
j
i(bri(g)) > 0. By construction of gk we have NC(g) ⊆ NC(gk) and by Lemma
4.2, we have Nj(g−i ⊕ i j) ⊆ Nj(gk
−i ⊕ i j) for all j ∈ N. Note that for all
players h′ ∈ NC(gk), there exists a network (gk)′ ∈ M◦H◦brk(g) where player




know by Lemma 5 that gi ∈ G3. Again, using the marginal payoﬀ function






−i⊕i j)Viℓ′ − ci =
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ((gk
−i)′⊕i ℓ) Viℓ′ − ci
≥
P
ℓ′∈Nℓ(g−i⊕i ℓ) Viℓ′ − ci = πℓ
i(g) > 0.
￿
Proof of Proposition 2 We start with the empty network ˙ g = g0. It is easy to check
that g0 ∈ G3. Either g0 is a Nash network, and we are done, or there exists a player,
say i, who does not play a best response in g0. In that case, we construct the network
21g1 ∈ M ◦ H ◦ bri(g0). We know from Lemma 3.3 that η(g0) < η(g1). From Lemma 5,
g1 ∈ G3 and from Lemma 6.1 and 6.2, we know that for all players j ∈ N and ℓ ∈ N,
g1
jℓ = 1 ⇒ πℓ
j(g1) > 0. Either g1 is a Nash network, and we are done, or there exists a
player, say j, who does not play a best response in g1. In that case, we construct the
network g2 ∈ M ◦ H ◦ brj(g1). We know from Lemma 3.3 that η(g1) < η(g2). Again
from Lemma 5, g2 ∈ G3 and from Lemma 6.1 and 6.2, we know that for all players
j ∈ N and ℓ ∈ N, g2
jℓ = 1 ⇒ πℓ
j(g2) > 0. It follows that we can construct a sequence
of networks {g0,g1 ...,gt,...} such that in gt−1, there exists a player, say k, who does
not play a best response, and gt ∈ M ◦ H ◦ brk(gt−1), η(gt−1) < η(gt), gt ∈ G3 and for
all j ∈ N, gt
jℓ = 1 ⇒ πℓ
j(gt) > 0. This sequence is ﬁnite since η(g) ≤ n2, for all g ∈ G .
￿
Proposition 2 establishes that if values of links are heterogeneous by pairs of players
and costs of links are heterogeneous by players, then a Nash network always exists. Note
that although this result is similar to the result of Haller et al. for two-way ﬂow models,
the proof is quite diﬀerent. Indeed in Haller et al. (2007) it is suﬃcient to reduce the
networks associated to the best response process to minimal networks for convergence
to a Nash network. This procedure cannot be used in our formulation because of the
existence of cycles in the best response process.
3.2 Existence of Nash networks under heterogeneity of costs
by pairs
We now study one-way ﬂow models when values of links are heterogeneous by players
and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs of players. costs of We can write the payoﬀ










i(g) denote the marginal payoﬀ of player i from player j in the network g. If
gij = 1, then π
j











Vi − cij. (7)
To prove the following proposition, we need an additional deﬁnition. First, note that
we cannot use our previous re-composition of the best response network. More precisely,
the deﬁnition of H is not appropriate in the case of heterogeneous cost. Indeed, in the
previous section, we could place players in the cycle without restrictions because there
is no diﬀerence for player i to form a link with either player j or player k since all links
costs are the same. However, this is not true in the case of heterogeneous costs.
So, let Hi : G → G be a correspondence where hi(g) ∈ Hi(g) satisﬁes the following
conditions.
• If g contains at most one cycle and there does not exist a link from a player
j  ∈ C(g) to a player k ∈ C(g), then g = hi(g).
• If player i has formed a link with no player j ∈ NC(g) or with at least two players
j ∈ NC(g) in g, then
1. if k is such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ NC(g), then k ∈ NC(hi(g));
2. if k  ∈ NC(hi(g)), then for all ℓ ∈ N, we have gℓk = hi(g)ℓk.
• If player i has formed a link with one and only one player j ∈ NC(g) in g, then:
1. if k is such that ℓ ∈ Nk(g) and ℓ ∈ NC(g), then k ∈ NC(hi(g));
232. if k  ∈ NC(hi(g)), then for all ℓ ∈ N, we have gℓk = hi(g)ℓk;
3. player i and player j belong to NC(hi(g)) and the link i j belongs to E(hi(g)).
We now deﬁne ˆ g
i as follows: ˆ g
i ∈ M◦Hi◦bri(g). We can now state the next proposition
which says that Nash networks always exist when the costs of link formation are not
very diﬀerent from each other relative to the value of information that the player can
obtain. If on the other hand the range of cost heterogeneity is large, then non existence
cannot be ruled out.
Proposition 3 Consider a game where values of links are heterogeneous by players and
costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs. Moreover, let the payoﬀ function be given by
(6). There always exists a Nash network if for all i,j,j′ ∈ N: |cij − cij′| < Vi.
Proof The proof of this proposition is rather long. It is similar to the proof of the
proposition 2 with ˆ g
i playing the same role as gi and hence is omitted. ￿
We turn now to the case where values and costs are heterogeneous by pairs. We give a
suﬃcient conditions which allow to guarantee the existence of Nash networks.
Corollary 1 Suppose a game where values and costs of links are heterogeneous by pairs.
Moreover, let the payoﬀ function be given by (1). If for all i,j,j′ ∈ N: |cij − cij′| <
mink∈N{Vik}, then there always exists a Nash network.
Recall that we have already shown that when values and costs are heterogeneous by pairs
and n > 3 a Nash network does not always exist. The above corollary is in the nature
of a silver lining since it provides a suﬃcient condition under which Nash networks will
always exist. The importance of these results stems from the fact that they identify
conditions under which Nash networks always exist under heterogeneity.
244 Discussion
The existing literature on one-way ﬂow models shows that over some parameters ranges,
Nash networks with speciﬁc properties exist. This amounts to providing suﬃcient con-
ditions for the existence of Nash networks. However, these conditions often do not cover
the entire parameters space and are unable to answer if Nash networks always exist.
Our paper ﬁlls this void in the literature.
To sum up our results we ﬁnd that as in two-way ﬂow models, cost heterogeneity
plays a key role in the non-existence of Nash networks in pure strategies. Indeed, if val-
ues are heterogeneous, but costs are not, then Nash networks always exist. The reason
for this is that cost heterogeneity oﬀers agents the possibility of substituting one link
for another. This can lead to cyclical behavior, i.e., a sequence of link switches that
never converges. We also ﬁnd that when the costs are not too diﬀerent from each other
(relative to values) Nash networks will always exist. There are however some diﬀerences
with two-way ﬂow models. In one way-ﬂow models, unlike in two-way ﬂow models, it
is not possible to rule out the existence of cycles in the best response process. This
completely changes the nature of proofs. Furthermore, we see that when there are too
few players (n < 4), then heterogeneity in values or costs cannot aﬀect the existence
of Nash networks in one-way ﬂow models. This is also due to the possibility of cycles
in one-way ﬂow models. In other words, we need a large enough set of players along
with heterogeneity to get non existence of Nash equilibria. This interaction between the
player set and heterogeneity does not arise in two-way ﬂow models.
Finally, our diﬀerent results raise two questions for future research. The ﬁrst is: Can
the introduction of a decay assumption change the diﬀerent results? Billand, Bravard
25and Sarangi (2006)6 show that there does not always exist a Nash network even in
a framework with homogeneous costs, heterogeneous values (by pairs) under decay for
two-way ﬂow models. This issue would be interesting in the context of directed networks.
Next, how sensitive are the results of the paper to the assumption of linearity in values
and costs? The issue of characterization and existence of Nash equilibria for networks
using more general payoﬀs under heterogeneity are interesting questions requiring further
work.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3 We successively prove each part of the Lemma.
1. Observe that for all k  = i, and for all j ∈ N, we have gkj = bri(g)kj. Hence,
if Nj(g) * Nj(bri(g)), then there exists a player k such that k ∈ Ni(g) and
k  ∈ Ni(bri(g)). Since g ∈ G3, we know from Lemma 2.2 and 2.3, that player i will
not be playing a best response if she deletes one of her links. Hence, if k ∈ Ni(g),
then k ∈ Ni(bri(g)), and we obtain the desired conclusion.
2. We know from the ﬁrst part of the lemma that Nj(g) ⊆ Nj(bri(g)). Also we know
that Nj(bri(g)) ⊆ Nj(g′), for all g′ ∈ M ◦ H(bri(g)). The result follows.
3. From the second part of the lemma, we know that Nj(g) ⊆ Nj(gi) for all j  = i.
We now show that if gi  ∈ BRi(g−i), then Ni(g) ⊂ Ni(gi). By Lemma 2.2 and
2.3, we know that player i cannot be playing a best response if she deletes links.
Hence, if she is playing a best response, it must be that Ni(g) ⊂ Ni(bri(g)). Since,
6Billand, Bravard and Sarangi, Heterogeneity in Nash networks, Working Paper (2006).
26we know that, for all g′ ∈ M ◦ H(bri(g)), Ni(bri(g)) ⊆ Ni(g′), we conclude that
Ni(g) ⊂ Ni(gi). Therefore, η(g) < η(gi).
￿
Proof of Lemma 4 We only prove the ﬁrst part of this lemma. The second part can
be proved using similar arguments. If j  ∈ NC(gi), then Nj(gi
−i) = Nj(gi). Indeed,
since gi ∈ G3, j  ∈ NC(gi), and gi
ij = 1, player j does not obtain any resources from
player i. Moreover, we have by construction, Nj(bri(g)) ⊆ Nj(gi). It follows that
Nj(gm ⊕ i j) ⊆ Nj(bri(g)) ⊆ Nj(gi) = Nj(gi
−i) ⊆ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i j).
Assume that j ∈ NC(gi), gi
ij = bri(g)ij = 1 and there exists a player ℓ such that
ℓ ∈ Nj(gm ⊕ i j) and ℓ  ∈ Nj(gi
−i ⊕ i j). So in bri(g), player i obtains resources from
player ℓ through a path containing j, and in gi player i obtains resources from player
ℓ through a path that does not contain j, since for all k ∈ N, Nk(bri(g)) ⊆ Nk(gi).
Hence, there is a player j′ where j′ ∈ Ni(gi), j′  ∈ NC(gi) and j′ ∈ Nj(gi) who has formed
a link with player ℓ between bri(g) and gi. This is not possible by construction.
￿
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